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by Poul F. Kjaer 
 
Abstract:  
 
On the backdrop of the 2008 financial crisis this paper introduces an understanding 
of societal crises as a reduction in the meaning production of social entities, which 
can either be internally or externally provoked. The emergence of constitutions and, 
more generally, constitutional structures, can be understood as responses to both 
forms of crisis. This is the case because they are double-edged structures which are 
simultaneously oriented towards the maintenance of internal order and stability within 
a given social entity at the same time as they frame the transfer of the meaning 
components between the social entities and their environments. Thus, the 2008 
financial crisis indicates a failure of constitutional bonding. When observed from an 
overall structural perspective, the reasons for this failure can be traced back to an 
increased discrepancy between the structural composition of world society and the 
constitutional structures in place. The crisis reflects a failure to respond to two 
simultaneous, inter-related and mutually re-inforcing structural transformations. First, 
there is the increased globalisation, which has led to massive dis-locations in the 
relative centrality of the different national configurations for the reproductive 
processes of functional systems. Second, there is a structural transformation of the 
transnational layer of world society through a reduced reliance on the 
centre/periphery differentiation and an increased reliance on functional differentiation. 
One of the many consequences of this development is the emergence of new forms 
of transnational  law and politics. A new constitutional architecture which reflects 
these transformations is needed in order to ensure an adequate constitutional 
bonding of economic processes, as well as of other social processes. 3 
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I.   Introduction 
An analytical distinction can be made between internally and  externally induced 
crises. The former  represents a discrepancy between the scope of meaning 
production (Sinnproduktion) and the intra-systemic resources available to support the 
production of meaning components. Such a crisis can thus also be understood as a 
crisis related to the internal production of time, in the sense that such crises tend to 
short-circuit the autopoietic reproduction that unfolds from moment to moment. The 
external forms of crisis take the form of crowding-out effects, negative externalities 
and asymmetries between social systems. In praxis, a crisis, however, tends to be a 
mixture of both forms. An externally-induced crisis will have internal effects and vice 
versa. 
The emergence of constitutions and, more generally, constitutional structures 
can be understood as evolutionary responses to both forms of crisis. This is the case 
because they are double-edged structures which are  simultaneously  oriented 
towards the maintenance of internal order and stability within a given social entity 
(and not just political entities in the state form) at the same time as they frame the 
transfer of the meaning components between the social entities and their 
environments. 
Thus, the 2008 financial crisis can be understood as a symptom which 
indicates a failure of constitutional bonding. When observed from an overall structural 
perspective, the reasons for this failure can be traced back to an increased 
discrepancy between the structural composition of world society and the 
constitutional structures in place. The crisis reflects a failure to respond to two 
simultaneous, inter-related and mutually re-inforcing structural transformations. First, 
there is the increased globalisation of functional systems, which has led to massive 
dis-locations in the relative centrality of the different national configurations for the 
reproductive processes of functional systems. Second, there is a structural 
transformation of the transnational layer of world society through a reduced reliance 
on the centre/periphery differentiation and an increased reliance on functional 
differentiation. One of the many consequences of this development is the emergence 
of new forms of transnational law and politics. A new constitutional architecture which 5 
 
reflects these transformations is needed in order to ensure an adequate 
constitutional bonding of economic processes as well as of other social processes. 
II.   Forms of Crises 
In its immediate form, a crisis represents a discrepancy between expectations and 
actual developments. In a more profound structural sense, a crisis represents a 
condition in which the scope of the meaning production (Sinnproduktion) of one or 
more social systems is being reduced over a considerable period of time. Such 
reductions might lead to various degrees of anomie, in the sense that the internal 
order of a given system is put under pressure, or it can be mortal, in the sense that it 
reduces the scope of meaning production to a degree which endangers the 
continued existence of the system(s) in question. 
One set of reasons for why reductions in meaning production occur is internal 
in nature. For example, a crisis related to the economic system might simply be the 
result of fluctuations of a business cycle which reflect a form of “systemic 
overstretching”, in the sense that the expansion of meaning production reaches an 
unsustainable level, thereby creating a discrepancy between the scope of meaning 
production and the intra-systemic resources and material basis available to support 
the production of the meaning components. Pyramid schemes within financing and 
other forms of financial speculation which lead to economic bubbles might be 
interpreted as representing severe forms of such overstretching. Military 
commanders who go a bridge too far, and – in more general terms - the ancient 
phenomenon of imperial overstretch in relation to political and military structures are 
other examples of this.
1
                                                 
 
 
1
   Stress related mental breakdowns might reflect a similar form of discrepancy induced crisis in relation 
to psychic systems. It might also be possible to understand internal crises, or at least the frequency of such crises, 
as a reflection of the increased acceleration (Beschleunigung) of the reproduction of societal structures. For a 
German critical theory perspective on the time structures of modern society, see H. Rosa, Beschleunigung: Die 
Veränderung der Zeitstrukturen in der Moderne, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005); for a French post-
structuralist perspective, see P. Virilio, Vitesse et Politique: essai de dromologie, (Paris: Galilée, 1977); for an 
American critical theory perspective, see W.E. Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of 
 6 
 
But a crisis might also be a result of a more profound structural process due to 
a weakening of a particular close coupling between systems due to increased 
differentiation (Ausdifferenzierung). For example, the continued crisis of the German 
university system might be traced back to an inability to adapt to the increased 
weakening of the institutionalised linking of the systems of science and education 
within the framework of the Humboldtian model. Scientific discoveries can, moreover, 
undermine established scientific facts, thereby potentially provoking a crisis in 
relation to an established scientific paradigm.
2
As we will return to in more detail later on, a different form of internal re-
configuration crisis stems from the increased globalisation of one or more systems. 
For example, the breakdown of Europe as a specific legal and political space 
(Raum)
 Another example can be found in the 
relative weakening of the position of the religious system in society due to the 
emergence of a whole range of functional systems in early modernity. Indeed, this led 
to an internal crisis for the Catholic Church due to an increased undermining of the 
world view upon which its coherency relied and an internal re-configuration of the 
religious system through the reformation. 
3
                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
Time,  (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).  For a systems theory perspective, see N. 
Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997), p. 997. 
  in the first half of the Twentieth century certainly led to a crisis of 
catastrophic dimensions. When viewed from a long-term perspective, this 
development was, however, intrinsically linked to an increased globalisation of the 
kind of statehood which characterised Europe at the time, due to the gradual 
inclusion of, first, the United States and Japan, and, eventually, the entire globe in 
2
   The consequence of the implosion of scientific paradigms however tend to be the emergence of an 
increased number of competing sub-discourses within a specific academic field. This, again, might have an 
increase in the scope of meaning production as a long-term consequence. For the emergence and implosion of 
scientific paradigms, see L. Fleck, Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache: Einführung 
in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, [1935] 1980); T.S. Kuhn, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago IL: Chicago University Press, [1962] 1996). 
3
   C. Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde. Im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum, (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, [1950] 1997), especially, p. 200 et seq. 7 
 
the modern state system.
4
Another set of reasons for the occurrence of a crisis is external in nature, in 
the sense that negative externalities, crowding-out effects and asymmetries between 
systems, lead to a reduction in the meaning production of one or more of the systems 
involved. From a purely analytical and somewhat “formalistic” Kantian and Spencer-
Brown inspired perspective,  the term  “external” cannot be understood in a strict 
causal sense.
 Although those affected by the European meltdown were, 
for good reasons, unlikely to understand the developments in such terms, the 
increased globalisation of statehood implied an increase in the meaning production of 
the global (-ising) political and legal systems when viewed from a long-term structural 
perspective. Hence, even though specific sub-systems, such as political sub-systems 
in the form of the major European powers, lose out, increased differentiation or 
system internal re-configurations often tend to imply mere contemporary reductions in 
meaning production, but a possible increase in meaning production in the long run. In 
this specific sense, differentiation and re-configuration crises might also be 
understood as potentially “constructive” forms of crises. 
5
  The crossing of system boundaries is a form of operation which 
requires time.
6
                                                 
 
 
4
   R. Stichweh, “Dimension des Weltstaats im System der Weltpolitik”, in: M. Albert & R. Stichweh 
(eds), Weltstaat und Weltstaatlichkeit. Beobachtungen globaler politischer Strukturbildung, (Wiesbaden: Verlag 
für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007). 
 As the receiving system, like all other systems, operates or, indeed, 
produces time in its movement from operation to operation, it will never be quite the 
same system at the time at which the external components arrive, as it was at the 
time at which the meaning components in question were dispatched. The receiving 
system is always one step ahead. In addition, external influences only have an effect 
when they are internally conceived and processed within the receiving system. The 
sovereignty of interpretation (Deutungshoheit) always remains the prerogative of the 
receiving system. Except for cases in which a system is being entirely eradicated in 
5
   Early insights going in similar direction, see N. Luhmann, Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität: Über 
die Funktion von Zwecken in sozialen Systemen, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, [1968], 1973), p. 250. 
6
   Although this might not necessarily be the case if an operation is repeated. See, also P.F. Kjaer, 
”Systems in Context. On the Outcome of the Habermas/Luhmann Debate”, (2006) Ancilla Iuris, p. 70 et seq. 8 
 
the Carthaginian sense, even the most systematic and prolonged forms of external 
pressure should, therefore, leave a certain degree of autonomy to the system which 
is the subject of external pressure.
7
Externally induced asymmetries can, at least in principle, occur between all 
social systems as issues such as doping (health versus sports), evangelism in the 
school system (religion versus  education), sexual harassment at the work place 
(intimacy  versus  formal organisations), pollution (economy versus  the socially-
constructed ecological environment), Islamic financing (religion versus the economy), 
pornography and the paparazzi  phenomenon (mass media versus  intimacy) 
illustrates. Such asymmetries, however, rarely lead to any profound crisis as long as 
they remain purely binary relations. Instead, they merely imply the existence of inter-
systemic “grey zones” which serve as causes of irritation for the systems involved, 
which subsequently tend to trigger regulatory attempts of containment by the legal 
system. In most cases, a “real” crisis first occurs when a complex constellation 
consisting of a whole range of mutually entangled and overlapping asymmetric 
relations between several systems manifest themselves over a considerable period 
of time, thereby generating a mutually re-inforcing drift towards systems decay. Thus, 
the form of crisis which they potentially provoke differs from system constellation to 
system constellation. 
 From a genuine sociological perspective, such 
autonomy is, however, often more a formal, than a real, prerogative, because, in 
practice, asymmetries tend to take the form of processes of impalpable coalescence 
(Zusammenfließen) which potentially leads to a slow, but steady, erosion of system 
boundaries. In most cases, such processes only create an atmosphere of continued 
dysfunctionality, but they are also capable of inflicting far more fundamental 
disturbances within the systems in question because the weakening of system 
boundaries can potentially lead to system dissolution. 
                                                 
 
 
7
   An equivalent figure related to subjects is Hegel`s point that the slave always has the possibility of 
dying in freedom through revolution or suicide. See G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder 
Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, Werke Band 7, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, [1821] 
1970), § 57. 9 
 
Another reason for variations in the form of crisis is that the relative weight 
between (self-) reflection (Reflexion), performance (Leistung) vis-à-vis other social 
systems  and societal function (Funktion) towards society as whole, differs from 
system to system. The consequence is that different systems produce different forms 
of effects vis-à-vis their social environments, and thus create different forms of crises. 
For example, within the systems of art, intimacy and certain strands of religion and 
science (Wissenschaft) reflection plays a relatively bigger role than within other 
functional systems due to the porous and very “fluid” media of communication upon 
which these systems rely. The consequence is that the forms of communication of 
which these systems consist tend to emerge as irritations within the most unexpected 
settings in their social environments. This again creates a tendency within these 
systems to elevate momentary, but creative, forms of de-differentiation into a 
systemic imperative (Systemziel), in the sense that art systematically seeks to break 
boundaries just as true love is supposed to defy all restrictions. As expressed in the 
strong reliance on a semantic of subjectivity, crisis experiences, moreover, tend to be 
framed in a personalised “existentialist” manner within these systems. But if the kinds 
of de-differentiation that these systems produce succeed in sustaining themselves 
over a considerable period of time, a semantic backlash which emphasises the 
danger of a decadent “Late Roman” downfall of society in its entirety tends to 
emerge, with the implication that hidden forces are mobilised against the Rasputins 
of this world. 
The political system is, on the other hand, characterised by a relatively 
stronger emphasis on the function which it produces vis-à-vis society in its entirety. 
When the political system operates in the state form, the strong emphasis on societal 
function is expressed through its orientation towards the (re-) construction of territory 
and the production of collectively-binding decisions. The relatively stronger focus on 
societal function does not, however, provide the political system with any sort of 
superiority. This is, first of all, the case because no hierarchy exists between function, 
performance and reflection. The integration of society remains conditioned by the 
simultaneous existence of all three forms. The three dimensions are not related to 
each other in the style of Russian dolls, where each one is contained in the following 
one. Second, although the tasks which the political systems reproduces are of a very 
fundamental nature, the relatively higher focus on the reproduction of functions vis-à-10 
 
vis society as whole is reflected in an equally strong reduction of the range of tasks 
which the political system in the form of the state deals with.
8
The extreme denseness, but the equally reduced form, of meaning production 
within the political system is also reflected in the forms of crises which the political 
system produces. In most cases, a political crisis, such as a crisis of succession, 
which threatens to break the autopoietic chain from operation to operation, only 
affects a small circle of players who operate within the kind of policy networks which 
tend to surround the peaks of political organisations.
 The political system 
might produce more compact components than systems with a stronger emphasis on 
reflection, but, as we will return to soon, the price paid is that the reach of political 
language remains limited, a limitation that subsequently tends to be “covered-up” 
through the kind of ideological semantics which, on paper, remain oriented towards 
society in its entirety. 
9
 Even when a coup d’état is 
orchestrated, life on the streets tends to return to normality within days. But as the 
totalitarian form of the political, in the form of Fascism, National Socialism, 
Communism and radical Islamism,
10
 illustrates, the political system is, under certain 
conditions, capable of taking unexpected evolutionary leaps through sudden 
expansion, thereby indicating that a close link exists between the general restraint of 
political forms of communication and the tendency of occasional tsunamis of massive 
energies.
11
                                                 
 
 
8
   We are here following Chris Thornhill, “Towards a Historical Sociology of Constitutional Legitimacy”, 
(2008) 2 Theory and Society, p. 161. 
 The presumption that a link exists between the general restraint of the 
political system and such tsunamis  is also supported by the fact that totalitarian 
politics tends to emerge within settings with relatively weak states, whereas strong 
9
   Another example is the EU where the autopoietic chain goes from treaty revision to treaty revision and 
where crises semantics emerges every time a revision process is delayed or threatens to fail. See, also, P,F. 
Kjaer, Between Governing and Governance: On the Emergence, Function and Form of Europe`s Post-national 
Constellation, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), p. 21 et seq. 
10
   For the argument that present-day Islamism is a variant of “traditional” Twentieth century totalitarian 
ideologies, see M. Mozaffari, “The Rise of Islamism in the Light of European Totalitarianism”, (2009) 1 
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, p. 1. 
11
   J.M. Lotman, Kultur und Explosion, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, [Russian original 2000] 2010). 11 
 
states tend to be capable of exercising sufficient self-restraint.
12
But also within the segment of the global political system characterised by 
democracy, the misuse of political and bureaucratic power and the “over-expansion” 
of government clearly remain a permanent theme as the century-long endeavour to 
limit the arbitrariness of political decision-making through constitutional safeguards 
illustrates. The expansion of political rationality has been closely linked to a tendency 
of juridification (Verrechtlichung) because the implementation of political decisions 
remains conditioned by the transformation of such decisions into generalised legally-
framed bureaucratic measures which, again, produce their own forms of anomalies.
 When such tsunamis 
occur, the consequence is a radical expansion of the segments of society which are 
succumbed to the political form of rationality, thereby introducing drastic reductions in 
the meaning production of other systems. As the history and fate of most forms of 
totalitarian politics indicates, such expansions, however, tend to lead to systemic 
overstretch and sudden implosion at a later stage. 
13
                                                 
 
 
12
   The same argument can be found in Chris Thornhill; see, for example, “Towards a Historical Sociology 
of Constitutional Legitimacy”, note 
 
The fact that the legal system coins such anomalies with the term “juridification” 
indicates that the legal system has a different societal emphasis than the political 
system in so far as performance vis-à-vis specific sections of society are the most 
dominating trademark of law. In terms of performance, the legal system acts as the 
transaction cost system par excellence. Almost all forms of the operationality of social 
systems rely upon a legal framing, or, at least, on the potential reference to legal 
instruments in their internal operations as well as in their reflections of their 
respective environments. Thus, the legal system provides far more specialised 
“services” to the remainder of society than the political system. On the one hand, this 
tends to reduce the degree of collateral damage caused by legal operations when 
compared to political operations. On the other, the legal elements tend to have a 
8 supra, p. 161. 
13
   M. Weber, “Bureaucracy”, in: H. Gerth & C.W. Mills (eds), From Max Weber, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1946); see, also, J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Band 1, 
Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981), p. 447 et 
seq. 12 
 
deeper impact on the concrete set up and the operational mode of other systems. 
Thus, the legal system is interfering in far more settings and different problem 
constellations than the political system, but it tends to do this in a less generalised 
manner, thereby providing a basis for the common misapprehension that the legal 
system is a mere “implementing tool” of the political system. 
The economic system also has a strong focus on performance. Intimacy and 
certain forms of religion are probably the exceptions which confirm the rule that 
functional systems cannot operate without relying on a continued flow of economic 
resources, and thus very tight couplings to the economic system. Whereas the legal 
system, in most cases, merely provides an overall framing, and, as such, tends to 
remain a “back-up” system which is only activated in cases of profound conflicts, the 
money medium, in contrast, enjoys a far more widespread use in the everyday 
operations of social systems. On the one hand, economic resources provide abilities, 
while, on the other, the continued need for financing tends to introduce a structural 
incitement of accommodation to economic rationality, as, for example, expressed in 
tendencies towards commercialisation within areas such as science, health, art and 
the mass media.
14
                                                 
 
 
14
   T.W. Adorno, The culture industry: selected essays on mass culture  , (London: Routledge, 1991); T.W. 
Adorno & M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (New York: Herder & Herder, [1972] 1994), p. 120 et 
seq. 
 Such accommodations mainly occur in contexts in which budget 
requirements have to be met. Thus, they mainly unfold within the framework of 
organisations such as universities, film studios, hospitals, art museums, newspapers 
and so on. This means that the effect on other functional systems is mainly indirect, 
in the sense that moves towards accommodation are rarely directly oriented towards 
the logic which guides functional  systems, but are, instead, oriented against  the 
organisational infrastructure upon which they rely. For example, New Public 
Management tools which are deployed in order to optimise organisations 
economically only indirectly influence the functional systems which are dependent on 
these organisations. Hence, the accommodation to economic rationality does not 
make the specific functional rationalities disappear, but they do indirectly reduce the 13 
 
field of possible operations to be selected because they tend to  frame the 
organisational structures upon which these systems rely. 
The strong focus on performance within the economic system and the 
widespread use of the money medium means that an economic crisis is likely to have 
more frequent and more rapid epidemic effects than crises within most other 
functional systems. Suddenly, budgets have to be cut and projects postponed, and 
typically this occurs in a relatively indiscriminate manner. Thus, the immediate form of 
a crisis, namely, a discrepancy between expectations and actual developments, is 
likely to be induced more frequently by the economic system than by most other 
systems. This, again, might explain why the economic system is often understood as 
being more prone to crises than other functional systems. But, although an economic 
crisis (for example, the Great Depression) is clearly capable of triggering massive 
societal transformations, this is rarely the case. A crisis within the economic system 
in its modern form seldom leads to a complete collapse in the integrity of other social 
systems, but merely introduces a temporary narrowing of possibilities. Thus, 
economic crises might be more frequent, but they also tend to have relatively 
superficial effects on the structural composition of the other parts of society. 
III.   The Limited Reach of Classical Political Language 
The temptation to bend objectives in order to accommodate the need for finance and 
the conception that the economic systems introduce frequent limitations on the scope 
of meaning production within other systems have traditionally produced a certain 
discomfort  vis-à-vis  the money medium and the logic which guides economic 
reproduction. One expression of this is the continued endeavour of political forces to 
“re-embed” the economic system.
15
                                                 
 
 
15
   For the thesis of dis-embeddedness, see K. Polanyi, The  Great Transformation. The Political and 
Economic Origins of our Time, (Boston MA: Beacon Press, [1944] 2001). 
  Political ideologies such as Conservatism, 
Socialism, Ecology, Nationalism and Islamism all share this aspiration. In their 
totalitarian versions, this is expressed in attempts to re-establish a holistic world 
through radical de-differentiation. In the softer and  non-totalitarian versions, the 14 
 
aspiration is expressed in well intentioned attempts to maintain “cosiness and ... 
rurality” (Nestwärme und … Ländlichkeit).
16
  Such substantialist ideologies are, 
however, semantic fictions, in the sense that they are constructions which reflect the 
“second nature” (zweite Natur) of modernity.
17
 Hence, although such fictions tend to 
have real effects,  they have never been capable of re-establishing the perceived 
blessings of the pre-modern world.
18
However, irrespectively of the ideology chosen, a conceptualisation which 
relies on classical political language fails to capture important dimensions. From the 
internal perspective of the political system, the question of the relation between the 
economic system and its environment is essentially reduced to the question of more 
or less statehood. But calls for “more state” ignores, as already indicated, the fact 
that blind evolutionary turns with real catastrophic effects tend to happen more often 
within the political, than within the economic, system. Moreover, political forces 
calling for a re-embedment of the processes of economic reproduction by the state 
fail to acknowledge that the state, too, is a dis-embedded structure. The modern state 
is, in contrast to pre-modern forms of rule, a distinct and abstract legal person, which 
is separate from its members. The modern sovereign state is a structure of 
generalised and impersonal rule, in the sense that all rules apply to all persons within 
a given territory. It is a form of rule which only requires a minimum of communication 
towards its subjects, and only in a form which refers to specific roles which unfold 
 The failure of substantialist forms of the political 
does not, however, mean, as liberalist ideology in its purest form advocates, that the 
relationship between the economic system and its environment is not marred by 
conflicts.  As  illustrated by issues such as pollution, prostitution and corruption 
asymmetries, crowding-out effects and negative externalities between the economic 
system and its social environment remains a permanent theme. 
                                                 
 
 
16
   Luhmann commenting on Ferdinand Tönnies’ concept of Gemeinschaft; see N. Luhmann, Die 
Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997), p. 1068. 
17
   See G.W.F. Hegel, note 7 supra, § 4. 
18
   P.F. Kjaer, “The Structural Transformation of Embeddedness”, in: Ch. Joerges & J. Falke (eds.), Karl 
Polanyi, Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 15 
 
within specific settings.
19
  The constitutional structures of modern states can, 
therefore, only be understood as dis-embedded structures.
20
 In addition, even “well-
intended” ventures, such as the political striving for the establishment of welfare state 
regimes, tend to produce negative side-effects in the form of reification and the 
transformation of citizens into clients, upon the basis of a, in the Weberian sense, 
rationalising logic.
21
 Thus, the market and the welfare state bureaucracy must be 
understood as two sides of the same dis-embedded coin. The classical state versus 
economy battle is, therefore, not a battle concerned with embedment. Instead, it is a 
battle concerned with the delineation of the meaning spheres, with none of the 
spheres in question possessing any particular substantialist superiority.
22
Whereas staunch defenders of the welfare state fail to acknowledge the dis-
embeddedness of the state,
 
23
 contemporary left- and right-Luhmannians circumvent 
the issue by taking a non-étatist stand. What they have in common is that they share 
a romantic vision of a self-organising society. In doing so, the left-Luhmannians follow 
in the footsteps of Marx, Gramsci, Polanyi, and Negri and Hardt, all of whom 
developed somewhat different, but equally vague, visions of a democratic, but non-
state based, organisation of the economy.
24
                                                 
 
 
19
   U.K. Preuss, “Disconnecting Constitutions from Statehood: Is Global Constitutionalism a Viable 
Concept?”, in: P. Dobner & M. Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), especially p. 26 et seq. 
 The right-Luhmannians, on the other 
20
   The disembeddedness of the state is acknowledged by James Tully, but regarded as “undesirable”. Here, 
following Thornhill and others, it is, instead, seen as a pre-condition for statehood. See J. Tully, “The 
Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy”, in: N. Walker & M. Loughlin (eds), The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 
318, and C. Thornhill, note 8 supra, p. 161. 
21
   For example, in relation to his re-formulation  of Adorno and Horkhheimer’s reification thesis 
(Verdinglichungsthese) one finds the following statement by Habermas; “The Social worker is just another 
expert which does not liberate the clients of the welfare state bureaucracy from their position as objects.” (my 
translation, PFK); J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Band 2, Zur Kritik der 
funktionalistischen Vernunft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981), p. 544. Habermas’ italics. 
22
   Kjaer, note 18 supra. 
23
   See, for example, W. Streeck, Re-Forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in the German Political 
Economy, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009). 
24
   For the left-Luhmannian programme announcement, see A. Fischer-Lescano, “Kritische Systemtheorie 
Frankfurter Schule”, in: G.-P. Calliess, A. Fischer-Lescano, D. Wielsch & P. Zumbansen (eds), Soziologische 16 
 
hand, advocate the self-organising network society upon the basis of Hayekian 
insights.
25
  The right-Luhmannian network approach sees networks as the 
fundamental building-blocks of society, and might thereby over-emphasise the 
importance of the network phenomenon to a degree which makes it difficult to identify 
the specific performance and societal function of networks in society.
26
 In relation to 
one central aspect, the approach does, however, possess an important theoretical 
advantage vis-à-vis the left-Luhmannian position, because one of its central points of 
focus is the concrete operational form of organisational structures. In contrast, the 
left-Luhmannians systematically tend to disregard the organisational aspect. The 
question of the concrete organisational model which they wish to advocate remains 
unanswered by the left-Luhmannians.
27
                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
Jurisprudenz. Festschrift für Gunther Teubner zum 65. Geburtstag, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009). See, also, 
S Buckel, Subjektivierung und Kohäsion. Zur Rekonstruktion einer materialistischen Theorie des Rechts, 
(Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2007). 
 Thus, the left-Luhmannian approach is not 
capable of providing an understanding of the kind of hyper-complex meltdowns of 
organisations and regimes, which can be observed in relation to the financial crisis 
which erupted in 2008. Instead, their central focus remains limited to various forms of 
civil society based “street activism” as a strategy capable of mobilising pressure for 
change. They tend to ignore the fact that pressure for change needs to be 
transformed into generalised bureaucratic measures if pensions are to be paid, 
treatments carried out in hospitals and alphabets learned at schools. But making it 
explicit that the realisation of political claims in modern society is impossible without 
the reliance on complex forms of formal organisation automatically highlights the 
limited reach of the left-Luhmannian agenda, because it radically restricts the 
potential role which they can play in society. As long as they do not undertake a 
combined analysis of the institutions and march through the institutions (Marsch 
durch die Institutionen), they will confine themselves to a parasitic role in which they 
25
   See, for example, K.-H. Ladeur, Der Staat gegen die Gesellschaft. Zur Verteidigung der Rationalität 
der Privatrechtsgesellschaft, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 2006). 
26
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Oeuvre of Karl-Heinz Ladeur”, (2009), 4 German Law Journal, p. 483. 
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are merely capable of irritating the autopoietic processes of social systems without 
profoundly interfering with the actual form of these processes. In practice, the 
function of the left-Luhmannians remains restricted to a recycling of the kind of 
supplementary partisan semantics originally cultivated by the left-Schmittians, with 
the predictable outcome that Che Guevara-style  struggles (Kämpfe) is ultimately 
elevated into an end in itself (Selbstzweck). 
In more general terms, emancipative social theory tends to ignore the fact that 
modern society is, above all, an  “organisational society” 
(Organisationsgesellschaft).
28
  The importance of the organisational dimension is 
underlined by the fact that it was the Seventeenth and Eighteenth century 
organisational revolutions, emerging from the preceding military revolutions,
29
 which 
provided the basis for the political and economic revolutions which unfolded in the 
late Eighteenth century and throughout the Nineteenth
 century.
30
 State bureaucracies 
and private firms have traditionally relied upon the same Hegelian and Weberian 
models of formal organisation.
31
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 Thus, the economy versus politics dichotomy does 
not capture and, indeed, actively hides the fact that the core logic of the 
organisational structures which economic and political structures rely upon remains, 
to a large extent, identical. For example, the organisational structure adopted by 
29
   For overviews and paradigmatic texts, see M. Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560-1660, (Belfast: 
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Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991). 
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modern firms in the breakthrough of industrialisation took the state bureaucracy as its 
role model, just as the introduction of New Public Management relies on the modern 
firm as its source of inspiration.
32
  The logic of disciplination and the systematic 
reduction of autonomy through subordination to hierarchy, as well as the “alienation” 
which occurs from the split between private and public are just as dominant within 
public as within private organisations. To the extent that one would want to identify 
an untapped potential for emancipation in late modern society, this can only be 
achieved through a break with the economy versus politics dichotomy and the quest 
for politicisation of society as a whole. Instead, the focus has to be oriented towards a 
lower and deliberately de-politicised level, in the sense that a transformation in the 
organisational forms “on the ground” is the central issue. In the most functionally-
differentiated parts of world society, the introduction of progressive pedagogical 
instruments in the school system and enabling management techniques aimed at 
increasing the autonomy and the self-organisation of employees is likely to have a far 
greater impact on the degree of autonomy of individuals than changes to the state 
constitution or random demonstrations in the streets. The patron-client relations of 
the chair (Lehrstuhl) based university, the equally semi-feudal structures of the family 
owned small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Mittelstandsunternehmen) and 
the hegemonic power of the legal profession (Juristenstand), operating within the 
framework of the political and legal systems in the form of the semi-authoritarian 
state (Obrigkeitsstaat), are the real issues. Or, to express it differently, the very 
concrete question concerning what action a member of a formal organisation can 
take without obtaining a signature from his or her manager (Vorgesetzter) is the 
genuine emancipatory question in contemporary society. However, existing strands 
of emancipative political and legal theory, in the main, miss this point,
33
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 as is also 
illustrated by the performative contradiction which one can observe in many 
33
   For example, the question of the concrete organisational form is essentially absent in Habermas’ 
deliberative theory. See J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des 
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academic settings. Senior academics advocate emancipation in their academic work 
at the same time as they, with different degrees of eagerness, are forced to rely on 
the classical disciplinary instruments of bureaucratic power when operating as 
science managers. Activation of the legal system is, moreover, not necessarily an 
answer to such problems. Formalised law merely tends to introduce even more 
inflexible and de facto hierarchical structures, in the sense that a strict legal framing 
tends to underpin, rather than to undermine, Weberian forms of organisation.
34
Étatist and non-étatist legal and political theory alike are frozen in a classical 
modernist ideological form which does not correspond to the actual form of social 
operations. Instead, management and organisation theory, together with pedagogical 
theory, are the most promising academic discourses when it comes to the question of 
producing meaning components which are capable of increasing the dynamics of 
emancipative social transformation in contemporary society. If one wanted to re-ignite 
a radically emancipative project today, seeking employment in a business school, in 
a school of public administration or in a pedagogical college would probably be more 
meaningful than entering the ranks of a legal or a social science faculty or partaking 
in a cross-over think tank.
 
35
 
 
IV.   The Constitutional Order of National Configurational Webs 
 
The limited reach of political language has direct implications for the understanding of 
how social order is produced in modern society, in so far as the conventional 
understanding of the role of the political system in society is intrinsically linked to the 
idea that the establishment of social order is the prerogative of the political system. 
The political system in the form of states certainly plays a central role, but this has 
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always been merely one of several dimensions. The phenomenon which, in 
mainstream language, is denoted as nation states should, instead, be understood as 
far more complex configuration, consisting of a whole range of functional sub-
systems, regimes, organisations, networks, professions and more or less intangible 
cultural components, all of which relate to each order in a multitude of ways. Such 
configurations are characterised by a dense web of mutually re-inforcing structural 
couplings within a limited section of world society, which establish a convergence of 
expectations between  multiplicities of observers. As such, they produce a kind of 
localised “higher order”, which cannot be reduced to the sum of its components. 
Instead, they have the character of autonomous universes which, to a large extent, 
constitute the social reality of individuals. 
Legal and political sub-systems clearly enjoy an important position within such 
configurations because their central societal function is to ensure the compatibility of 
the time structures of such configurations (gesamtgesellschaftlichen Zeitausgleich).
36
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But this does not mean that such configurations merely represent the sum of the 
legal and the political systems, or that they can be understood as structures in which 
other societal structures are succumbed to the primacy of the political-legal complex. 
The limited reach of political and legal framings can be illustrated by the fact that the 
different dimensions of such configurations rely on different degrees of territorial 
boundedness. For example, whereas clearly defined territoriality is very outspoken in 
relation to legal and political sub-systems, the term “national economies” remains a 
far more porous and metaphorical concept, notwithstanding the fact that a higher 
density of economic exchange can be observed within configurational orders. But the 
different dimensions do not just operate with different degrees of territorial 
boundedness. Prior to the introduction of the Euro, Belgium and Luxembourg were a 
common monetary area; the humanities (Geisteswissenschaft) and parts of the social 
science which rely on the German language, are probably better understood upon 
the basis of linguistic, rather than territorial, delineations, thereby adding Austria and 21 
 
the German-speaking parts of Switzerland to the core of German speaking 
academia, just as one observes that Canadian baseball clubs play in the US league, 
rather than in a separate Canadian league and so forth. Such examples, first of all, 
illustrate that territorial delineations remain internal boundaries and are not politically- 
or legally-established frames. Moreover, that the existence of a configurational web is 
not conditioned by complete identical territorial delineations within its different 
dimensions, but merely by a certain degree of territorial overlap. The idea that the 
sovereign state possesses absolute power within its territory is, therefore, a semantic 
fiction which has never actually existed in reality.
37
Thus, a configurational web does not constitute unity in a substantialist sense 
and no singular state-embedded national culture exists.
 
38
 Instead, it is possible to 
observe a multitude of mutually re-inforcing, overlapping and thus intertwined 
cultures in the form of, for example, national legal cultures, national political cultures, 
national science cultures and – within the economy – the specific social praxis of 
“doing business”. Apart from serving as “reservoirs” of knowledge, and thus as a 
basis for learning, such cultures also act as “internal environments” of the respective 
functional systems, in the sense that they frame the horizons which are taken into 
account in the continued selection of operations, thereby serving as stabilisation 
mechanisms which reduce the volatility of societal reproduction. They rely on 
“fictional semantics”, in the form of, for example, foundational myths and the social 
constructions of languages, traditions and “vested interests”, which are specific to 
each sphere of society. They are abstract constructions, or, in Hegelian terms, 
“second natures”,
39
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real effects in terms of which forms of communications are selected.
40
One central aspect of configurational webs is mutual stabilisation through the 
emergence of dense institutionalised links, in the form of, for example, (neo-) 
corporatist structures of the kind which emerged in the wake of the increased 
differentiation between the economic and the political system. Thus, configurational 
webs reduce the autonomy of the systems in question, at the same time as they tend 
to increase the ability of these systems to rely on the meaning components produced 
by other systems, thereby providing systems with additional “productive capacities”. 
Configurational webs represent highly improbable and complex evolutionary 
outcomes because they imply a mutual fixation of a whole range of systemic 
structures which allow for continued expansion at the same time as the internal 
volatility of system reproduction is reduced through the capture of the web. 
Successful configurations can thus be seen as evolutionary responses to the looming 
threat of crises, in the sense that they produce order, understood as social stability, 
through the reduction of the internal volatility within its different components at the 
same time as externally-induced crowding-out effects and asymmetries are 
minimised. 
 They serve as 
frames for the production of societal trust within their respective societal spheres, 
and, as such, provide a contribution to the internal stability of such structures, in the 
sense that they tend to reduce volatility. Whereas functional systems, in their core, 
operate upon the basis of clear cut system boundaries and accordant internal 
density, system cultures are far more fluid and overlapping, and, as such, are far less 
dense, thereby establishing a high level of inter-systemic entanglement. 
The reality of configurational webs is mainly established at the level of 
organisations and regimes, in the sense that, as already indicated, formal 
organisation is the backbone of modern society. Formal organisation is the  form 
through which internal order is established within functionally-delineated areas just as 
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they serve as the “contact points” for inter-systemic exchange. For example, within 
the economic system, major firms function as complex structures of ordering in which 
mother companies, subsidiaries, suppliers, distributors, retailers and consumers are 
all drawn into mutually re-inforcing relationships, just as the “self-organisation” of the 
economic sphere is reflected in the establishment of complex conglomerates of firms, 
associations of employers, trade associations, unions, chambers of commerce and 
so forth. In addition, such structures tend to engage in institutionalised co-ordination 
mechanisms (Verhandlungssysteme),
41
  partnerships
42
  and networks
43
  with extra-
systemic organisations. Similar functionally-delineated compositions can be observed 
within areas such as science, religion, mass media and so forth.  The form of 
stabilisation which such organisations produce is, however, conditioned by an 
instrumental harmonisation of social structures through a highly intrusive social 
engineering of social roles and praxis, which drastically reduces the span of their 
possible operations. For example, one crosses the Rhine and suddenly systems 
theory is terra incognita  because it does not correspond with the institutionalised 
praxis of sociology in the French university system.
44
The consequence is that a particular form of second order politics can be 
observed, in the sense that the internal form of ordering within functional spheres 
becomes a question which is channelled into organisational arrangements which 
produce collectively-binding decisions or the functional equivalents to collective 
decisions within their respective functional areas. Such forms of the political do not, 
however, imply a totalising state or a “complete” politicisation of society. This is, first 
of all, the case because such forms of the political remain a “secondary code” which 
merely operates as an attachment to the codes of the system in question. Secondly, 
the strong reliance on formal organisation introduces forms of organisational 
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stabilisation which are specifically oriented towards enabling and limiting such forms 
of the political in the same operation, thereby reducing the chances that political 
communication is taken to the streets and subsequently turned into a witch-hunt by 
the mob. Thus, “societal” or non-state forms of the political remain limited to a 
specific form of organisational politics. 
It follows from this that successful configurations neither operate upon the 
basis of a total subordination of society to political rationality, nor in a form in which 
the political only resides in the state in the narrow formalistic Luhmannian sense. 
Instead, a certain gradualisation of the political can be observed, in the sense that 
some linkages between the state-based form of the political and secondary forms 
remains tighter than others, just as the internal degree of hierarchy within the 
secondary forms differs from one societal area to another.
45
The central institutional structure which configurational orders rely upon is the 
constitutional form. In relation to configurational webs, a whole range of constitutional 
structures can be observed in the form of, for example, state constitutions, economic 
and social constitutions, church constitutions and the constitutions of organisations 
(for example, the constitutions of companies and associations). Configurations are 
thus characterised by very complex constitutional conglomerates, in which state 
constitutions only provide one (very important) element. Constitutions can be 
understood as structures which establish and maintain generalised principles for the 
production of norms and the resolution of conflicts between such norms upon the 
basis of their own sources of authority while relying upon a legal framework. Another 
central characteristic of constitutions is that they are characterised by a time 
  It is therefore not 
surprising that a radical restraint of the political, as, for example, advocated by 
libertarians, or the totalisation of the political through a quest for “radical democracy”, 
have shown themselves to be equally unviable evolutionary paths for the political 
system. 
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discrepancy, in the sense that they change over time, but generally at a slower pace 
than the societal structures against which they are oriented. They are societal 
anchors which frame societal developments, in the sense that they, at the same time, 
limit the number of potential operations which can be selected, and provide principles 
which aim to facilitate the selection of actual operations. As such, they can also be 
understood as forms of ordering, in the sense that they constitute the form of 
reproduction of the selfsame social structures against which they are oriented. 
The framing of the social order is achieved through a double movement, in the 
sense that constitutions simultaneously constitute internal order within their 
respective functional areas and establish the possibility of stabilised linkages with 
other fields through the invoking of rights. They are simultaneously oriented towards 
the reduction of internal volatility and the safeguarding of autonomy vis-à-vis  the 
outside world through targeted measures which aim to reduce asymmetries and 
crowding-out effects. A safeguarding of autonomy which, however, not only takes the 
form of a negative delineation, but also takes the form of stable, but narrow, links 
which enable co-evolutionary processes to take place through the institutionalisation 
of inter-systemic transfers of meaning components. 
Constitutions are circular constructions in the sense that they are particular 
dense forms of the selfsame structures which they are oriented against. This is also 
expressed in their reliance on formal organisation. In praxis, they are, therefore, not 
societal constitutions, in the sense that a political or an economic constitution 
constitutionalises political or economic forms of communication as such. A 
constitution does not reach out to the extra-parliamentary opposition 
(Außerparlamentarische Opposition) or to the black economy, or if it does, it does so 
only partially. Instead, they merely constitutionalise the parts, which rely on formal 
organisation, thereby introducing automatic limitations. This again highlights the 
importance of second order politics within non-state based spheres of society. The 
transfer of meaning components through an institutionalised and legally-framed 
linking of functional systems remains conditioned by the existence of internal 
translation mechanisms which take the form of second order politics. Second order 
politics serve as the addresses of constitutionally-framed communication. In their 
external functions, constitutions respond to the double problem of ensuring linkages 26 
 
and overlaps at the same time as the ever present threat of coalescence is being 
curtailed. They are evolutionary counter-measures (Gegensteuerungsmechanismen) 
which serve as forms which aim to curtail structural drifts towards coalescence, in the 
sense that they seek to counter asymmetric relations and the entanglement of 
functional cultures through the formalisation of authority, competences and decisional 
procedures just as they more generally consolidate the functionally-differentiated 
character of society through their underpinning of the organisational set-up upon 
which functional systems rely.
46
 
 Constitutional bonding is the real Wunderwaffe with 
which internally and externally induced crises are confronted. 
V.   The Globalisation of National Configurational Webs through Crisis 
 
The kind of configurational webs normally associated with nation states can also be 
understood as conglomerates of Eigenstructures  (Eigenstrukturen).
47
  The 
emergence of such configurations in Europe took place within  the framework of 
already existing feudal structures. The evolution of modern forms of organisation, 
territory, law, the economy, politics and so forth came about through a 
metamorphosis of feudal structures.
48
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  Modern configurations emerged through 
century-long processes in which the pre-modern structures were only gradually 
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the previously existing structures, but nonetheless ended up marginalising these 
selfsame structures over time. 
Although relics of the feudal structures continue to exist in European settings 
(for example, constitutional monarchies and nobility networks), they no longer occupy 
a central position in society. However, a variant of the conflictual relationship 
between pre-modern and modern structures continues to have central importance in 
large parts of the world today. This is the case because, through imperialism, the 
specific western form of societal organisation was exported throughout the entire 
globe. The consequence is that large parts of the world - most notably in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America - continue to be characterised by multiple layers, in the sense that 
modern forms of organisation that are essentially of European origin -  such as 
codified legal systems and generalised bureaucratic structures - have been imposed 
“on top” of (in the Western sense) traditional forms of societal organisation, without 
achieving a complete marginalisation of traditional forms of societal organisation. 
Thus, the different logics that they represent continue to operate simultaneously, 
either in a separate but entangled manner, or through the formation of hybrid 
structures which combine elements from the two dimensions.
49
 The basic institutional 
features of modern society, such as constitutions, contract law, property rights and so 
forth might be in place at the same time as pre-modern forms of differentiation, in 
different degrees and variations, continue to define the form of social operations 
“beneath” modern structures, and often in a manner which short-circuits the operative 
practices of the modern structures.
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 In most places in the world, not only the state, 
but also the kind of configurational webs described above, remain a fairly new 
phenomenon, in the sense that the globalisation of such structures first unfolded in 
the wake of the de-colonialisation processes of the mid-Twentieth century. Thus, 
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modern forms of societal organisation have become globalised, but, at the same 
time, within large sections of the world, they only provide a thin layer which has not 
(yet) acquired a degree of depth which enables them to be the dominating form of 
structural pattern reproduction. 
Having said that, the history of the Twentieth century can be understood as 
having been characterised by a movement towards a gradual, but steady, increase in 
the relative importance of functionally-differentiated structures, and, with it, modern 
forms of state-based territorial differentiation and configurational webs. One of the 
many consequences of this is a reduction in global centre/periphery differentiation as 
an independent form of pattern reproduction. The first major indication of this 
movement unfolded through a breakdown of the distinction between “Europe and the 
rest” in the first half of the Twentieth century, and thereby of the kind of European 
“configuration of national configurations” which, with increasing strength, had 
characterised Europe from the Sixteenth century onwards. Although the cause for the 
military, economic and other catastrophic events which followed was undoubtedly 
triggered by a very complex constellation of factors, including the breakdown of the 
constitutional stabilisation mechanisms within national configurations,
51
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 the overriding 
structural reason seems to be a failure of functional systems and (inter-) national 
configurational webs to adapt internally to increases in the globalisation of the 
selfsame systems through adequate internal re-configurations. For example, the 
changes brought about by the relative increase in the centrality of the United States 
for the economic system from the late Nineteenth century onwards was not reflected 
in a concordant shift in the institutional set-up. The British Pound remained the global 
anchor currency long after the basis for that role had disappeared. In a similar 
manner, the rising importance of the United States was not reflected in an increased 
role of the US political system within the globalising political system in the inter-war 
period, thereby creating a discrepancy between the form and the location of 29 
 
economic and political reproduction processes and the institutional architecture which 
aimed to stabilise these processes. Only after the catastrophe did sufficient learning 
processes unfold through the establishment of the Bretton-Woods system, the 
institutionalisation of the US dollar as the global anchor currency, and the internal re-
configuration of the global political system through the handover of the hegemonic 
credentials from the UK to the US. 
The re-stabilising constitutional architecture of the “Westphalian-Keynesian 
frame”,
52
 as outlined in the Bretton-Woods architecture, however, only maintained 
itself for a few decades, just as it essentially remained a structure which had the 
North Atlantic space as its core.
53
 As embodied by the collapse of the Bretton-Woods 
arrangement, a gradual breakdown of the distinction between the “West and the rest” 
started in the 1970s, with the increased (re-) inclusion of Japan and, later on, through 
the increased weight of other parts of the East Asian region in the world economy. 
Future historical studies might, therefore, come to the conclusion that the 2008 
financial crisis can only be adequately understood when it is seen as a culmination of 
a far bigger transformational shift which has been unfolding from the 1970s onwards; 
a shift which was contemporarily concealed through the kind of super-bubble, 
compromising a whole range of sub-bubbles within financial markets, private 
consumption, housing, government spending and so forth,
54
 which had characterised 
large parts of the global economy in the last three decades.
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  Thus, the full 
magnitude of this development first became apparent with the 2008 financial crisis. 
For the first time since global society emerged some 500 years ago, the majority of 
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the world is likely to belong to the centre by the time the crisis is over, in the sense 
that the parts of world society associated with states such as Brazil, China, India and 
Russia will no longer be confined to a peripheral role, thereby making the 
centre/periphery distinction increasingly obsolete. The transformation of G8 into G20 
is the first institutional indication of this development. 
Thus, what we have come to understand with the term globalisation in the last 
decades is probably better understood as a transitional phase which implies a 
relative change in the weight and centrality of different national configurations.
56
                                                 
 
 
56
   For similar insights, albeit upon the basis of reductionist view which reduces such transformation 
processes to a question of an expansion of a pure economic logic, see I. Wallerstein, “Globalization or the age of 
transition?”, (2000) 2 International Sociology, p. 249. 
 
Crude Seventeenth century-inspired perspectives which assume that states are 
holistic entities encompassing society as whole are likely to see such transformations 
as merely reflecting a change in the balance of power between states. The relative 
weight and importance of states are certainly affected by such transformations, but, 
in practice, we are dealing with far more fundamental changes in the relative weight 
of  different,  but mutually dependent, dimensions of national configurations which 
have been caused by a fundamental change in the deeper structures 
(Tiefenstrukturen) of society through an increased reliance on functional 
differentiation. As such, the current transitional phase merely implies yet another 
expansion of the primacy of functional differentiation into ever larger parts of the 
globe; an expansion which has led to the breakdown of the existing stabilising 
regimes within different functional areas, and the urgent need for developing 
replacements which correspond to the new structural realities. As such, the 2008 
crisis reflects a discrepancy between the structural composition of the world economy 
and the (inter-) national regulatory architecture which aims to stabilise it. In this 
sense, the current crisis, and also the crisis of the 1930s, can be understood as a 
form of globalisation crisis. This does not mean that globalisation, as such, is the 
problem, but it does mean that a striking inability to respond to structural 
transformations can be observed, in the sense that the increased globalisation of 31 
 
functional systems is not reflected in the corresponding adaptations and re-
configurations of the institutional, and, indeed, constitutional, framing of economic 
processes, as well as other social processes. Both the Great Depression and the 
2008 crisis indicate that an orderly “hand-over” of the role of the anchor of the world 
economy in the wake of structural transformations seems impossible to achieve. 
 
VI.   Crisis through Coalescence 
 
Not surprisingly, the process leading to the 2008 financial crisis has certain structural 
affinities with the kind of processes which unfolded in the transitional phases which 
led to a replacement of the European with the North Atlantic space. The breakdown 
of the European space which began to unfold in the late Nineteenth century, and 
which manifested itself in the two World Wars in the first half of the Twentieth 
century, implied a radical breakdown of the boundaries between functional systems, 
in the sense that the political system in the state form radically expanded its reach. 
The need to mobilise resources for the war effort during the First World War implied a 
radical expansion of the incursions of states into other societal spheres. The 
economy became a war-economy (Kriegsökonomie), science was transformed into 
an instrument for the development of military technology, the education system was 
transformed into an instrument for the reproduction of patriotism and so forth.
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However, in practice, the expansion of the state was a two-way street because the 
expansion of the public realm through an incorporation of private structures over time 
undermined the inner constitution of the political system, in the sense that the 
privatistic logic guiding the incorporated special interests increasingly came to 
dominate the state. Thus, the central consequence which emerges from the first half 
of the European catastrophe was coalescence in the sense that the functionally-32 
 
differentiated infrastructure of modernity as provided by organisational systems was 
exposed to immense pressure and, in some parts of world society, it completely 
collapsed, thereby providing the basis for the kind of totalitarian politics which came 
to dominate in the second half of the European implosion process.
58
The “cheap money” regime which the expansion of the global economy, with 
the US economy as its anchor, has relied upon in the last three decades can be 
described with a similar vocabulary. The introduction of a new financial regime upon 
the basis of monetarist ideology represented an unviable compensatory reaction to 
structural changes, which led to a partial breakdown of the functional separation 
between the political and the economic system. The relative weakening of the 
position of the United States as the “engine” and institutional anchor of the world 
economy over the last four decades created immense pressure for increasing growth 
levels in order to maintain a dominating position. Although such processes are far too 
complex to be reduced to the outcome of formalised political decisions, the 
introduction of “Reaganomics”  as a vehicle for winning the Cold War and, more 
generally, to maintain the standing of the United States in the world, is a case in 
point. The so-called neo-liberal ideological framework which was developed in order 
to underpin this development was, in principle, based upon the idea of a 
retrenchment of the state in order to let the market reign upon the basis of self-
correcting processes. The consequence was, however, not so much a cut-back of the 
state, as a re-configuration of the state and the tax regime upon which it relied. The 
result of the latter was an increase in economic social inequality. But, from a long-
term perspective, the re-configuration of the state was far more important in so far as 
it led to a capture of the raison d'État by privatistic interests, thereby undermining the 
distinction between political and economic rationality. This was not only the case in 
relation to the privatisation of natural monopolies (water supply, railways, etc.) which 
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have always operated on the borderline between the private and the public sphere. 
Instead, a far more profound capture took place through the introduction of New 
Public Management instruments throughout the state, thereby subsuming political 
operations to economic rationality. 
In addition, the regulatory function of the political system in the state form vis-
à-vis  the economic system was broken down through the move towards the de-
regulation of the financial markets, a move which, however, was not so much about 
the degree of public control as a move implying capture, in the sense that public 
regulators influenced by monetarist ideology were transformed from being the 
guardians of the public interest into being the servants of the financial industry, with 
the result that the relationship between operators and regulators increasingly became 
characterised by coalescence. This effectively undermined the value of the structural 
coupling between the economic and the political system, in the sense that the form of 
stability and restraint imposed by public regulation vis-à-vis economic processes was 
increasingly weakened. This had subsequent effects internally in the financial system 
because the differentiation between different functions, products and levels of risk 
collapsed, in the sense that the distinction between banks, investment banks and 
hedge funds became increasingly blurred. Thus, apart from a general re-inforcement 
of publicly sanctioned regulation, a case can be made for a new form of societal 
constitutionalism
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note 
  within finance. A form of societal constitutionalism which has 
functional separation (the Volker Rule) as it is core element, in the sense that it is 
oriented towards maintaining a separation between different segments of the finance 
industry, and thereby reducing the risk of exposure which low-risk activities, such as 
traditional banking, are confronted with from high-risk activities such as hedge 
funding. A complex re-configuration of the overall logic guiding the financial system 
based upon a double-movement of public measures and private self-regulation is 
28 supra. 34 
 
needed.
60
back
  Measures which are internally intended to establish firewalls between 
different sectors of the financial system and which are externally aimed at curtailing 
coalescence through the maintenance of functional separation between the 
economic system and other social spheres, such as the political system, which, at the 
same time, function as channels for their simultaneous    coupling 
(Rückkopplung), are established through constitutionalised and thus limited structural 
couplings which rely on formal organisation and a formalised legal framing. 
It follows from the above that the real problem exposed by the financial crisis 
is not first and foremost a question of the size of the state. Although it remains a 
legitimate and important field of political contestation, the question of whether the 
state should occupy 30% or 40% of GDP is not the real issue. The real danger is, 
instead, the breakdown of the operative distinction between political and other forms 
of social rationality, such as economic rationality. All the different variants of political 
fundamentalism share the characteristic that they seek to overcome the “original sin” 
(Sündenfall) of functional differentiation
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  through the submission of society in its 
entirety to a single form of rationality. Fundamentalist ideologies are ideologies of 
coalescence. As such, neo-liberalism is, in its logical composition, also to be 
understood as a fundamentalist ideology, in so far as it seeks to impose a one-
dimensional economistic logic on society in its entirety. The difference -  apart, of 
course, from the radically different degrees of societal “damage” which different 
fundamentalist ideologies have actually coursed -  is that extreme cases such as 
Communism, Fascism and National Socialism sought to submit society in its entirety 
to an immediate form of the political without relying on an external semantic universe 
as a medium. These totalitarian ideologies share the view that the political system in 
the totalitarian form should transpose itself into all others spheres of society upon the 
basis of an unmediated political logic. They advocate a naked form of power in which 
61
   N. Luhmann, Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989), p. 264. 35 
 
the ambition to achieve the submission of society in its entirety is not covered up, but 
is, instead, deliberately highlighted and re-inforced as a purpose in itself. In contrast, 
neo-liberalism and fundamentalist forms  of ecology, nationalism, religious 
fundamentalism and socialism, share the feature that they paradoxically use a single 
universe which is external to the political system, such as economic, environmental, 
national or religious belief systems, as a vehicle for the attempt to submit society to a 
totalising political ideology. In contrast to radical totalitarian ideologies, they rely upon 
an “inter-mediating variable” in their relation to other parts of society, and it is this 
single inter-mediating variable which they seek to transpose to society in its entirety. 
Thus, paradoxically, an ideology such as neo-liberalism, which is seemingly aimed at 
reducing the reach of the political system as much as possible, can only achieve this 
through political means and within the framework of a political universe. As such, 
neo-liberalism remains guided by political, rather than economic, rationality, in the 
sense that the intention to submit society in its entirety to an economistic logic 
remains foremost a political objective, and only secondarily an economic one. 
 
VII.   Constitutionalising Transnational Configurational Webs
62
 
 
The current crisis is, however, different from earlier crises in one central aspect 
because the globalisation of statehood and national configurational webs has gone 
hand in hand with a profound structural transformation of the transnational layer of 
world  society. The core structural components of this transformation is a steady 
decrease in the relevance of centre/periphery differentiation and a radical increase in 
the reliance on functional differentiation as the organisational principle of 
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transnational  processes.
63
  A double-movement is unfolding, in the sense that the 
globalisation of statehood and the re-configuration of transnational structures away 
from centre/periphery differentiation and towards functional differentiation have 
developed in a co-evolutionary manner. The move from the form of the colonial 
company to the multinational firm, and the emergence of a whole range of 
functionally-delineated regulatory institutions, such as the WTO, the IMF and the 
World Bank, in relation to economic processes and similar, though often more 
embryonic, structures within other societal spheres, represented a profound shift 
which came about in the wake of de-colonialisation. Such structures were deeply 
entangled with national configurations and, at the same time, they also contained a 
specific transnational dimension. Multinational firms remain closely embedded in the 
legal culture and the praxis of doing business, which characterises the configuration 
of their origin at the same time as they tend to develop an additional transnational 
dimension which enables them to operate on a global scale.
64
 They develop forms of 
internal ordering and mechanisms which aim to ensure their ability to transplant 
meaning components, such as products, capital and human resources into a whole 
range of different configurational settings. In a similar manner, public international 
organisations tend to remain “state-based”, in the sense that they operate upon the 
basis of delegation at the same time as they develop an additional transnational 
dimension which operates on a logic which is not captured by the logic of 
delegation.
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 A metamorphosis is taking place, in the sense that a multiplicity of new 
structures, which increasingly acquire a life of their own, emerges from traditional 
20 supra. 
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public and private international law formations.
66
The consequence of the transformation of the transnational layer of world 
society is not only the gradual emergence of new organisational forms, such as 
multinational companies within the economic sphere in the course of the Twentieth 
century, but also the emergence of new forms of law and politics, which aim to 
stabilise these organisational forms. Within legal discourses, the emergence of 
transnational law has been intensely discussed by scholars such as Amstutz, 
Koskenniemi and Teubner, among others, while emphasising characteristics such as 
inter-contextuality,
  So far, the relationship between 
national and transnational structures has been characterised by a relationship of 
mutual increase. Thus, the extent to which transnational Eigenstructures increasingly 
possess the potential to marginalise the institutional structures which characterise 
national configurations remains to be seen. When Zhou Enlai, the first Premier of 
Communist China, was asked in the mid-Twentieth century for his opinion on the 
historical significance of the 1789 French Revolution, he is said to have replied: “It’s 
too soon to tell.” The same is probably the case in relation to the relationship 
between national and the emerging transnational configurations. 
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  gradualisation,
68
  cognitivisation,
69
  hybridity,
70
  fragmentation
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and heterarchy.
72
  The central structural transformation which looms behind these 
developments can, however, be traced back to the insight contained in Luhmann`s 
“speculative hypothesis” of the law’s future transformation away from a reliance on 
territorial boundaries and towards an increased reliance on functional differentiation 
upon the basis of a relative shift away from normative expectations towards cognitive 
expectations.
73
While accepting the basic premises, one might argue that this perspective falls 
a bit too short in relation to one important aspect. The modern legal system evolved 
in a close co-evolutionary relationship with the political system and the advocates of 
transnational or world law (Weltrecht) implicitly or explicitly work on the assumption 
that this tight co-evolutionary relationship is being weakened through globalisation.
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This is, indeed, the case if one maintains a classical and de facto (inter-) state-based 
concept of the political as the point of reference. But what if the political system has 
also undergone a metamorphosis? Indeed, it can be argued that similar structural 
transformations as those associated with the concepts of inter-contextuality, 
cognitivisation, hybridity, fragmentation and heterarchy within law can also be 
detected within the political system. Thus, the functional synthesis of law and the 
political might not have disappeared at all but only be taking a different form in the 
transnational layer of world society. A form which remains unobservable when 
viewed through the classical conceptual apparatus of the political. Instead, a new 
context and function-specific concept of the political are needed in the same manner 
the as ongoing developments within the global legal sphere require a new concept of 
transnational law. 
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Today, configurative structures organised along functionally-, rather than 
territorial-, delineated lines exist in a whole range of settings. First, genuine political 
organisations, such as the WTO, the WHO, the FAO and so forth, have emerged.
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Although these structures deal with different substance matters, they remain political 
organisations, in the sense that their operations are subordinated to political 
rationality, just as they, to different degrees, rely on forceful compliance mechanisms. 
Second, (increasingly) autonomous structures, such as multinational firms and 
globally operating NGOs, are faced with the question of how to maintain internal 
order while operating in a multi-contextual environment. Multinational companies are 
complex conglomerates which typically  compromise a multitude of subsidiaries, 
which, for example, makes the question of the degree of (de-) centralisation of 
authority a recurrent issue. Thus, no multinational can operate without refined 
hierarchical control mechanisms in terms of decision-making procedures, evaluation 
schemes and auditing systems, which are closely linked to the ability to impose 
negative sanctions on lower levels and the production of a densely-defined set of 
norms to guide the deployment of these control mechanisms. Private transnational 
structures are also faced with the Hobbesian question of how social order is 
maintained. Third, transnationally operating organisations are engaged in permanent 
endeavours to stabilise relations to their social environments. A distinction can be 
made here between intra-  and extra-systemic relations. When multinational 
companies engage with sub-contractors and supplier networks, this is a process 
which unfolds within the economic field. Relations with research institutions, public 
authorities and NGOs, on the other hand, fall markedly outside the economic field. 
Despite the difference in the character of the relations, similar institutional forms 
oriented towards the structuring of such interaction tend to emerge. But, whereas the 
functional dimension (Sachdimension) is likely to be central to the first dimension 
because the actors are operating within the same sphere, the social dimension 
(Sozialdimension) is likely to be stronger within the second dimension. When the 40 
 
issue in question implies a need to bridge a gap between different spheres of society, 
the need for negotiation or dialogue schemes, from which common ground can be 
found, tends to be greater. 
In addition, it is possible to observe the emergence of overarching regimes 
which bind together a whole range of public and private elements within a given 
functionally-delineated field. What is common for regulatory organisations, as well as 
multinationals, is the fact that they tend to become parts of larger conglomerates, in 
the sense that a multiplicity of observers, in the form of producers, consumers, 
regulators and so forth, become part of functionally-delineated configurative 
processes which tend to produce a convergence of expectations between the actors 
in question upon the basis of a (more or less well-developed) set of principles, norms 
and rules, which together constitutes a “higher order”.
76
  Moreover, such 
developments imply the development of independent sources of authority. A key 
example here is the function of “scientific knowledge” within risk regulation (for 
example, within the Comitology structures of the EU, and the SPS committee of the 
WTO and private self-regulation bodies). In other cases, the backbone of functional 
regimes tends to be constituted through the emergence of specialised institutions 
which develop globally deployed ranking instruments. This is, for instance, the case 
in relation to capital markets,
77
  sports,
78
  freedom of the press
79
  and higher 
education.
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 Such ranking instruments serve as forms through which the operations 
of actors within the area in question are benchmarked, thereby producing a global 
cognitive space. Ranking and benchmarks instruments are used to establish 
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foundational structures which other actors within the functional area in question have 
to  position themselves in relation to.
81
Delving a bit deeper, it is, moreover, possible to observe that transnational 
structures have adopted a number of concepts which serve as functional equivalents 
to concepts which provide the constitutive infrastructure of the political in the nation-
state form. The concepts of “nation,” “the public sphere”, “representation” and 
“delegation” are being substituted by the concepts of “stakeholders”, “transparency”, 
“self-representation” and “accountability”. The transnational concepts have a far 
higher cognitive component than their nation-state counterparts, thereby illustrating 
that not only transnational law but also transnational politics is characterised by a 
high degree of cognitivisation. 
  They provide the constitutive basis for 
functionally-delineated universes with a global reach. In some cases, the rankings 
are, moreover, supplemented by certification instruments, such as those developed 
by ISO (product standards) and FLO-CERT (Independent International Certification 
Agency for Fairtrade Production Processes and Products), which even more 
proactively seek to transform the way in which actors operates within a given area. 
Stakeholders: The political system in the nation-state form relies on the nation (or 
“the people”), understood as a generalised and abstract legal construction, in order 
(1) to delineate the reach of their power; (2) to act as a form through which power is 
transposed into other parts of society; (3) and as a form through which social 
complexity is reduced, in the sense that the concept of the nation is used to delineate 
the part of the world which a given political sub-system takes account of in its 
decision-making. The latter form is closely associated with the concept of democracy. 
Democracy can be understood as a specific form through which the political system 
observes its own environment - a form that is characterised by a duality between 
stability and change, in the sense that the people, through the conception of the 
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nation, is defined as a (relatively) stable entity, at the same time as the “nature of the 
people”, in terms of preferences, interests, and norms are dynamic, thereby allowing 
the political system to increase its level of reflexivity and thereby its ability to adapt 
when changes occur in its environment. Thus, the specificity of democracy (when 
compared to other forms of rule such as feudalism and totalitarianism) is that, within 
the framework of the nation, it remains open to the future, in the sense that what 
counts as a politically-relevant problem, or how it should be  dealt with, is not 
prescribed.
82
The stakeholder concept essentially fulfils a similar role in transnational space. 
Transnational structures are characterised by an absence of territorially-delineated 
polities, which leads to systematic uncertainty concerning what the “collective” is, 
what decision-making within transnational structures is oriented against, just as it 
remains uncertain who exactly are affected by such decisions. It remains far more 
uncertain which segment of the social environment transnational structures should 
observe in order to be able to adapt to changes in their environments. The concept of 
stakeholders can be as seen as a response to such uncertainty. Stakeholders are an 
institutionalised set of “actors”, who are granted the status of “affected parties”, and 
thereby are granted the right to “feed into” decisional processes at the same time as 
they also serve as the addressees for such decisions. Thus, the stakeholder status 
serves as a form through which the entity in question delineates the section of its 
social environment, which it regards as relevant for its operationability. It is the form 
through which it transmits the meaning components which it produces at the same 
time as it serves as a frame through which changes in its social environment can be 
observed, thereby providing a basis for increased adaptability through increased 
reflexivity. When viewed from a historical perspective, nations have rarely been 
 In this specific sense, democracy is characterised by a high level of 
adaptability and this is probably the reason why it has proved to be “evolutionary 
superior” when measured against the other forms of rule which have existed so far. 
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particularly stable in terms of their extent and composition. However, the stakeholder 
form is even more “fluid”. The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion operate with a far 
higher speed in relation to stakeholders, and, in this sense the borders of stakeholder 
regimes, are extremely contingent. This flexibility, on the one hand, makes them 
more adaptive than the form of the nation, and thereby potentially even more 
“evolutionary superior” than democratic structures. On the other hand, the price paid 
for such fluidity is a “loss of depth”, in the sense that the kind of impact which can be 
achieved through this form might be relatively limited. 
Transparency: In the nation-state context, the public sphere is widely understood as 
the form through which the will formation of the polity takes place.
83
 However, radical 
increases in social complexity mean that only a very limited number of potentially 
relevant issues can be processed within the public sphere. Although the mass media 
system, which serves as a central component of the public sphere, has undergone 
profound globalisation in recent decades, the public sphere remains essentially 
limited to the nation-state form.
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 In the transnational space, organisations such as 
multinational firms, public and private international organisations and other 
transnational bodies have, instead, upon the basis of self-reflexive processes, 
developed principles and policies of transparency which aim to increase their 
observability by other structures. Examples of such structures include rules permit 
access to documents within public international organisations and the steps towards 
the development of a global regime of financial accounting standards. Again, we see 
an increased reliance on cognitive structures, in the sense that strategies of 
transparency enable social entities to observe developments within other social 
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entities and to adapt accordingly, without necessarily engaging in the demanding 
task of common will formation. 
Self-representation: Within continental philosophy, the notion of representation was 
de-constructed a long time ago. However, this has largely been ignored within legal 
and political theory, just as the self-understanding and institutional set-up of nation-
state democracies continue to rely on a dualist concept of representation.
85
 In the 
absence of representative structures of the kind which characterise democracies, 
entities operating in the transnational space have, instead, been forced to develop 
strategies of self-representation upon the basis of - to use a Habermasian term - 
dramaturgical rationality. Transnational structures re-present  themselves  towards 
their environments. Public organisations develop policy programmes and establish 
targets for their achievement just as multinationals and NGOs develop ethical 
charters concerning the way in which they conduct their activities. They publicly 
declare their intentions in the form of illocutionary acts which tend to become (more 
or less) self-binding.
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Accountability:  Closely related to the concept of representation, the concept of 
delegation plays an important role in the institutional set-up of states, as well as in 
their interaction with the transnational layer, due to the delegation of competences to 
international organisations. But a delegation is always more than just a delegation. 
Each delegation of legal competencies implies a de facto  recognition of the 
autonomy of the structures to which competencies are delegated. Structures 
operating upon the basis of delegation tend both to exercise significant discretionary 
powers and to frame policy areas in a manner which produces a limited number of 
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options for further policy development. They also tend to develop specific norms and 
become policy actors in their own right.
87
 Delegation of competencies always implies 
a step into the unknown and the uncontrollable. Thus, a “gap” exists between what 
can be controlled through delegation and the structures which are actually in place. It 
is this gap which is filled out through the emergence of different forms of 
accountability measures, for example, through the development of accountability 
charters which lay down operational standards and norms. This development can 
also be seen as being closely-related to the development of a “right to justification”, in 
the sense that the observers which are (negatively) affected by a given activity tend 
to develop claims that the effect must be justified.
88
All of the different dimensions of the transnational form of the political outlined 
above have been widely discussed and analysed by academics in the last decades. 
What seems to be lacking is the development of a general theory capable of linking 
them systematically together. When observed in isolation, the mutual supportive 
character of these dimensions is not clear. Only a more general conceptual 
framework will make it possible to observe empirically to what degree the observed 
phenomena constitute, or, potentially, will be capable of constituting, “higher orders” 
beyond national configurations. 
 
In addition, the relationship between the transnational form of the political and 
transnational forms of law will have to be systematically clarified. The most promising 
instrument for such kind of bridging is the constitutional concept. In relation to 
national configurations, the linking of law and politics through constitutions serves as 
a form of mutually-beneficial (self-) binding which provides a basis for establishing a 
relation of mutual increase between change and stability. Due to the substantially 
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different function and form of transnational law and politics when compared to nation-
state law and politics, a constitutional binding would, however, have to look very 
different. Although the tensions between change and stability, and contingency and 
certainty, are very similar, the institutional structures involved are very different. But, 
as already indicated, the constitutional concept has always been used in relation to a 
plurality of institutional structures.
89
When transposed to the transnational space, this definition makes it possible 
to argue that a multitude of constitutions already exists in the transnational sphere, in 
the sense that companies, private and public international organisations and NGOs 
can all be said to have, more or less developed, constitutional structures. However, 
following the definition above, such constitutions are “internal constitutions”, in the 
sense that they are very much linked to the question of internal order. The external 
dimension, in terms of how such institutions relate to their social environments and, 
more specifically, how asymmetries, crowding-out effects and negative externalities 
are dealt with, possesses a different set of problems. As the kind of heterarchical 
governance structures which, in the form of regimes, tend to emerge in-between 
hierarchical structures are structures in their own right, in the sense that they produce 
independent societal effects, a different set of enabling and limiting rules tends to 
 Beside state constitutions, the concept has been 
used in relation to church constitutions, company constitutions 
(Unternehmensverfassungen), labour constitutions and economic constitutions. In all 
these cases, constitutions can be understood as an instrument which, in its political 
function, frames the body of rules and norms, which establishes the formal structure, 
decisional competences and a hierarchically-based locus of authority within a given 
social entity at the same time as it, in its legal function, lays down principles for the 
structuring of conflicts between the norms within such an entity. Constitutions are, in 
this sense, laying down the enabling and the limitative rules which guide social 
entities. 
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emerge in relation to these structures. One might argue that such non-hierarchical 
co-ordination processes are subject to constitutionalisation processes, to the extent 
that they rely on legally-ramified principles which determine the inclusion of actors as 
well as well-developed procedures of decision-making. 
A third dimension relates to the kind of overarching configurations which 
emerges when a multiplicity of actors, organisations and the interlocking governance 
structures are bound together within a principle-based and legally-ramified overall 
framework. The term constitutionalism, although it has traditionally been understood 
as referring to a theory of constitutions, might be a useful term to describe such 
elements. Such configurations are closely-connected to an agenda concerned with 
the establishment of an overarching order in the transnational space which has only 
been partially realised to date. Thus, in the transnational context, the  term 
constitutionalism can, at the same time, serve as a regulatory idea and as the basis 
for the description of the embryonic features of a new order capable of curtailing 
coalescence under changed structural conditions. 
 
VIII.   Conclusion 
 
The 2008 crisis is a reflection of a double movement which took the form of increased 
globalisation of national configurations and thus dislocations in the relationship 
between national configurations and a transformation of the structural composition of 
the transnational layer of world society. Changes occurred, which were not 
adequately reflected in the accordant adaptations of the stabilising structures which 
economic and other forms of societal reproduction rely upon, thereby creating the 
basis for the kind of over-expansion through acceleration, asymmetric relations and 
coalescence which led to overstretching, de-differentiation and subsequent collapse. 
The response therefore needs to rely on two equally important and inter-related 
dimensions: first an establishment of a new public constitutional order of the world 
economy (Bretton Woods II), which should adequately reflect the present degree of 
globalisation of the world economy and the relative weight of national configurations. 
The rise of Asia needs to be reflected in the institutional set-up which guides the 48 
 
world economy. This move should also imply the establishment of a global currency 
unit, whose aim is to avoid the kind of transformation processes with the disastrous 
effects which tend to unfold every time structural transformations necessitate a shift 
in the global anchor currency. However, such a new global regulatory architecture will 
imply more not less transnationality, thereby also actualising the need for additional 
constitutional measures in order to stabilise and control the transnational dimension 
of public international structures. 
Secondly, the already existing, but highly disperse, forms of private 
constitutional arrangements in relation to firms, trade associations, self-regulatory 
frameworks, collegial institutions and so forth would need to strengthened and 
systematised, thereby increasing the double reflexivity emerging from such 
processes in order to create a dense net of mutually re-inforcing intra- and inter-
systemic webs; that is to say, both in relation to the internal stabilisation of the 
economic system and in relation to the external impact of economic reproduction. In 
practice, the self-constitution of societal sectors through the increased establishment 
of internal mechanisms of ordering implies an institutionalisation of a transnational 
variant of the kind of second order politics within the non-state social structures which 
characterise national configurations and the legal underpinning of such structures 
through a hierarchy of norms. 